MuseLetter #188 / December 2007
by Richard Heinberg

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What Will We Eat as the Oil Runs Out?
The Lady Eve Balfour Lecture, November 22, 2007

Our global food system faces a crisis of unprecedented scope. This
crisis, which threatens to imperil the lives of hundreds of millions and
possibly billions of human beings, consists of four simultaneously
colliding dilemmas, all arising from our relatively recent pattern of
dependence on depleting fossil fuels.

The first dilemma consists of the direct impacts on agriculture of
higher oil prices: increased costs for tractor fuel, agricultural
chemicals, and the transport of farm inputs and outputs.

The second is an indirect consequence of high oil prices - the
increased demand for biofuels, which is resulting in farmland being
turned from food production to fuel production, thus making food more
costly.

The third dilemma consists of the impacts of climate change and
extreme weather events caused by fuel-based greenhouse gas emissions.
Climate change is the greatest environmental crisis of our time; however,
fossil fuel depletion complicates the situation enormously, and if we fail
to address either problem properly the consequences will be dire.

Finally comes thedegradation or loss of basic natural resources
(principally, topsoil and fresh water supplies) as a result of high rates,
and unsustainable methods, of production stimulated by decades of cheap
energy.

Each of these problems is developing at a somewhat different pace
regionally, and each is exacerbated by the continually expanding size of
the human population. As these dilemmas collide, the resulting overall food
crisis is likely to be profound and unprecedented in scope.

I propose to discuss each of these dilemmas briefly and to show how all
are intertwined with our societal reliance on oil and other fossil fuels. I
will then argue that the primary solution to the overall crisis of the
world food system must be a planned rapid reduction in the use of fossil
fuels in the growing and delivery of food. As we will see, this strategy,
though ultimately unavoidable, will bring enormous problems of its own
unless it is applied with forethought and intelligence. But the organic
movement is uniquely positioned to guide this inevitable transition of the
world's food systems away from reliance on fossil fuels, if leaders and
practitioners of the various strands of organic agriculture are willing to
work together and with policy makers.

Structural Dependency

Until now, fossil fuels have been widely perceived as an enormous boon
to humanity, and certainly to the human food system. After all, there was a
time not so long ago when famine was an expected, if not accepted, part of
life even in wealthy countries. Until the 19th century - whether in China,
France, India or Britain - food came almost entirely from local sources and
harvests were variable. In good years, there was plenty - enough for
seasonal feasts and for storage in anticipation of winter and hard times to
come; in bad years, starvation cut down the poor, the very young, the old,
and the sickly. Sometimes bad years followed one upon another, reducing the
size of the population by several percent. This was the normal condition of
life in pre-industrial societies, and it persisted for thousands of
years.¹

By the nineteenth century a profound shift in this ancient regime was
under way. For Europeans, the export of surplus population to other
continents, crop rotation, and the application of manures and composts were
all gradually making famines less frequent and severe. European farmers,
realizing the need for a new nitrogen source in order to continue feeding
burgeoning and increasingly urbanized populations, began employing guano
imported from islands off the coasts of Chile and Peru. The results were
gratifying. However, after only a few decades, these guano deposits were
being depleted. By this time, in the late 1890s, the world's population was
nearly twice what it had been at the beginning of the century. A crisis was
in view.

But crisis was narrowly averted through the use of fossil fuels. In
1909, two German chemists named Fritz Haber and Carl Bosch invented a
process to synthesize ammonia from atmospheric nitrogen and the hydrogen in
fossil fuels. The process initially used coal as a feedstock, though later
it was adapted to use natural gas. After the end of the Great War, nation
after nation began building Haber-Bosch plants; today the process yields
150 million tons of ammonia-based fertilizer per year, producing a total
quantity of available nitrogen equal to the amount introduced annually by
all natural sources combined.²

Fossil fuels went on to offer other ways of extending natural limits to
the human carrying capacity of the planet.

In the 1890s, roughly one quarter of British and American cropland had
been set aside to grow grain to feed horses, of which most worked on farms.
The internal combustion engine provided a new kind of horsepower not
dependent on horses at all, and thereby increased the amount of arable land
available to feed humans. Early steam-driven tractors had come into limited
use in 19th century; but, after World War I, the effectiveness of powered
farm machinery expanded dramatically, and the scale of use exploded
throughout the twentieth century, especially in North America, Europe, and
Australia.

Chemists developed synthetic pesticides and herbicides in increasing
varieties after World War II, using knowledge pioneered in laboratories
that had worked to perfect explosives and other chemical warfare agents.
Petrochemical-based pesticides not only increased crop yields in North
America, Europe, and Australia, but also reduced the prevalence of
insect-borne diseases like malaria. The world began to enjoy the benefits
of "better living through chemistry," though the environmental costs, in
terms of water and soil pollution and damage to vulnerable species, would
only later become widely apparent.

In the 1960s, industrial-chemical agricultural practices began to be
exported to what by that time was being called the Third World: this was
glowingly dubbed the Green Revolution, and it enabled a tripling of food
production during the ensuing half-century.

At the same time, the scale and speed of distribution of food increased.
This also constituted a means of increasing human carrying capacity, though
in a more subtle way. The trading of food goes back to Paleolithic times;
but, with advances in transport, the quantities and distances involved
gradually increased. Here again, fossil fuels were responsible for a
dramatic discontinuity in the previously slow pace of growth. First by rail
and steamship, then by truck and airplane, immense amounts of grain and
ever-larger quantities of meat, vegetables, and specialty foods began to
flow from countryside to city, from region to region, and from continent to
continent.

The end result of chemical fertilizers, plus powered farm machinery,
plus increased scope of transportation and trade, was not just an enormous
leap in crop yields, but a similar explosion of human population, which has
grown over six-fold since dawn of industrial revolution.

However, in the process, conventional industrial agriculture has become
overwhelmingly dependent on fossil fuels. According to one study,
approximately ten calories of fossil fuel energy are needed to produce each
calorie of food energy in modern industrial agriculture.³ With
globalized trade in food, many regions host human populations larger than
local resources alone could possibly support. Those systems of global
distribution and trade also rely on oil.

Today, in the industrialized world, the frequency of famine that our
ancestors knew and expected is hard to imagine. Food is so cheap and
plentiful that obesity is a far more widespread concern than hunger. The
average mega-supermarket stocks an impressive array of exotic foods from
across the globe, and even staples are typically trucked or shipped from
hundreds of miles away. All of this would be well and good if it were
sustainable, but the fact that nearly all of this recent abundance depends
on depleting, non-renewable fossil fuels whose burning emits
climate-altering carbon dioxide gas means that the current situation is not
sustainable. This means that it must and will come to an end.

The Worsening Oil Supply Picture

During the past decade a growing chorus of energy analysts has warned of
the approach of "Peak Oil," the time when the global rate of extraction of
petroleum will reach a maximum and begin its inevitable decline.

During this same decade, the price of oil has advanced from about US$12
per barrel to nearly $100 per barrel.

While there is some dispute among experts as to when the peak
will occur, there is none as to whether. The global peak is merely
the cumulative result of production peaks in individual oilfields and whole
oil-producing nations, and these mini-peaks are occurring at an increasing
rate.

The most famous and instructive national peak occurred in the US in
1970: at that time America produced 9.5 million barrels of oil per day; the
current figure is less than 5.2 Mb/d. While at one time the US was the
world's foremost oil exporting nation, it is today the world's foremost
importer.

The history of US oil production also helps us evaluate the prospects
for delaying the global peak. After 1970, exploration efforts succeeded in
identifying two enormous new American oil provinces - the North Slope of
Alaska and the Gulf of Mexico. During this period, other kinds of liquid
fuels (such as ethanol and gas condensates) began to supplement crude.
Also, improvements in oil recovery technology helped to increase the
proportion of the oil in existing fields able to be extracted. These are
precisely the strategies (exploration, substitution, and technological
improvements) that the oil producers are relying on to delay the global
production peak. In the US, each of these strategies made a difference -
but not enough to reverse, for more than a year or two at a time, the
overall 37-year trend of declining production. To assume that the results
for the world as a whole will be much different is probably unwise.

The recent peak and decline in production of oil from the North Sea is
of perhaps of more direct relevance to this audience. In just seven years,
production from the British-controlled region has declined by almost
half.

How near is the global peak? Today the majority of oil-producing nations
are seeing reduced output: in 2006, BP's Statistical Review of World
Energy reported declines in 27 of the 51 producing nations listed. In
some instances, these declines will be temporary and are occurring because
of lack of investment in production technology or domestic political
problems. But in most instances the decline results from factors of
geology: while older oil fields continue to yield crude, beyond a certain
point it becomes impossible to maintain existing flow rates by any
available means. As a result, over time there are fewer nations in the
category of oil exporters and more nations in the category of oil
importers.⁴

Meanwhile global rates of discovery of new oilfields have been declining
since 1964.⁵

These two trends (a growing preponderance of past-peak producing
nations, and a declining success rate for exploration) by themselves
suggest that the world peak may be near.

Clearly the timing of the global peak is crucial. If it happens soon, or
if in fact it already has occurred, the consequences will be devastating.
Oil has become the world's foremost energy resource. There is no ready
substitute, and decades will be required to wean societies from it. Peak
Oil could therefore constitute the greatest economic challenge since the
dawn of the industrial revolution.

An authoritative new study by the Energy Watch Group of Germany
concludes that global crude production hit its maximum level in 2006 and
has already begun its gradual decline.⁶ Indeed, the past two
years have seen sustained high prices for oil, a situation that should
provide a powerful incentive to increase production wherever possible. Yet
actual aggregate global production of conventional petroleum has stagnated
during this time; the record monthly total for crude was achieved in May
2005, 30 months ago.

The latest medium-term report of the IEA, issued July 9, projects that
world oil demand will rise by about 2.2 percent per year until 2012 while
production will lag, leading to what the report's authors call a "supply
crunch."⁷

Many put their hopes in coal and other low-grade fossil fuels to
substitute for depleting oil. However, global coal production will hit its
own peak perhaps as soon as 2025 according to the most recent studies,
while so-called "clean coal" technologies are three decades away from
widespread commercial application.⁸ Thus to avert a climate
catastrophe from coal-based carbon emissions, our best hope is simply to
keep most of the remaining coal in the ground.

The Price of Sustenance

During these past two years, as oil prices have soared, food prices have
done so as well. Farmers now face steeply increasing costs for tractor
fuel, agricultural chemicals, and the transport of farm inputs and outputs.
However, the linkage between fuel and food prices is more complicated than
this, and there are other factors entirely separate from petroleum costs
that have impacted food prices. I will attempt to sort these various
linkages and influences out in a moment.

First, however, it is worth taking a moment to survey the food price
situation.

An article by John Vidal published in the Guardian on November 3,
titled "Global Food Crisis Looms As Climate Change and Fuel Shortages
Bite," began this way:

Empty shelves in Caracas. Food riots in West Bengal and
Mexico. Warnings of hunger in Jamaica, Nepal, the Philippines and
sub-Saharan Africa. Soaring prices for basic foods are beginning to lead to
political instability, with governments being forced to step in to
artificially control the cost of bread, maize, rice and dairy products.

Record world prices for most staple foods have led to 18 percent food
price inflation in China, 13 percent in Indonesia and Pakistan, and 10
percent or more in Latin America, Russia and India, according to the UN
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). Wheat has doubled in price, maize
is nearly 50 percent higher than a year ago and rice is 20 percent more
expensive. . . .

Last week the Kremlin forced Russian companies to freeze the price of
milk, bread and other foods until January 31. . . .

India, Yemen, Mexico, Burkina Faso and several other countries have had,
or been close to, food riots in the last year. . . . Meanwhile, there are
shortages of beef, chicken and milk in Venezuela and other countries as
governments try to keep a lid on food price
inflation.⁹

Jacques Diouf, head of the FAO, said in London early this month, "If you
combine the increase of the oil prices and the increase of food prices then
you have the elements of a very serious crisis. . . ." FAO statistics show
that grain stocks have been declining for more than a decade and now stand
at a mere 57 days, the lowest level in a quarter century, threatening what
it calls "a very serious crisis."¹⁰

According to Josette Sheeran, director of the UN's World Food Program
(WFP), "There are 854 million hungry people in the world and 4 million more
join their ranks every year. We are facing the tightest food supplies in
recent history. For the world's most vulnerable, food is simply being
priced out of their reach."¹¹

In its biannual Food Outlook report released November 7, the FAO
predicted that higher food prices will force poor nations, especially those
in sub-Saharan Africa, to cut food consumption and risk an increase in
malnutrition. The report noted, "Given the firmness of food prices in the
international markets, the situation could deteriorate further in the
coming months."¹²

Meanwhile, a story by Peter Apps in Reuters from October 16 noted that
the cost of food aid is rising dramatically, just as the global need for
aid is expanding. The amount of money that nations and international
agencies set aside for food aid remains relatively constant, while the
amount of food that money will buy is shrinking.¹³

To be sure, higher food prices are good for farmers - assuming that at
least some of the increase in price actually translates to higher income
for growers. This is indeed the case for the poorest farmers, who have
never adopted industrial methods. But for many others, the higher prices
paid for food simply reflect higher production costs. Meanwhile, it is the
urban poor who are impacted the worst.

Impact of Biofuels

One factor influencing food prices arises from the increasing incentives
for farmers worldwide to grow biofuel crops rather than food crops. Ethanol
and biodiesel can be produced from a variety of crops including maize, soy,
rapeseed, sunflower, cassava, sugar cane, palm, and jatropha. As the price
of oil rises, many farmers are finding that they can produce more income
from their efforts by growing these crops and selling them to a biofuels
plant, than by growing food crops either for their local community or for
export.

Already nearly 20 percent of the US maize crop is devoted to making
ethanol, and that proportion is expected to rise to one quarter, based
solely on existing projects-in-development and government mandates. Last
year US farmers grew 14 million tons of maize for vehicles. This took
millions of hectares of land out of food production and nearly doubled the
price of corn. Both Congress and the White House favor expanding ethanol
production even further - to replace 20 percent of gasoline demand by 2017
- in an effort to promote energy security by reducing reliance on oil
imports. Other nations including Britain are mandating increased biofuel
production or imports as a way of reducing carbon emissions, though most
analyses show that the actual net reduction in CO2 will be minor or
nonexistent.¹⁴

The US is responsible for 70 percent of world maize exports, and
countries such as Mexico, Japan, and Egypt that depend on American corn
farmers use maize both as food for people and feed for animals. The
ballooning of the US ethanol industry is therefore impacting food
availability in other nations both directly and indirectly, raising the
price for tortillas in Mexico and disrupting the livestock and poultry
industries in Europe and Africa.

Grain, a Barcelona-based food-resources NGO, reports that the Indian
government is committed to planting 14 million hectares with Jatropha for
biodiesel production. Meanwhile, Brazil plans to grow 120 million hectares
of fuel crops, and Africa up to 400 million hectares. While currently
unproductive land will be used for much of this new production, many
millions of people will be forced off that land in the
process.¹⁵

Lester Brown, founder of the Washington-based Earth Policy Institute,
has said: "The competition for grain between the world's 800 million
motorists, who want to maintain their mobility, and its two billion poorest
people, who are simply trying to survive, is emerging as an epic
issue."¹⁶ This is an opinion no longer being voiced just by
environmentalists. In its twice-yearly report on the world economy,
released October 17, the International Monetary Fund noted that, "The use
of food as a source of fuel may have serious implications for the demand
for food if the expansion of biofuels continues."¹⁷ And earlier
this month, Oxfam warned the EU that its policy of substituting ten percent
of all auto fuel with biofuels threatened to displace poor farmers. Jean
Ziegler, a UN special rapporteur went so far as to call the biofuel trade
"a crime against humanity," and echoed journalist George Monbiot's call for
a five-year moratorium on government mandates and incentives for biofuel
expansion.¹⁸

The British government has pledged that "only the most sustainable
biofuels" will be used in the UK, but, as Monbiot has recently noted, there
are no explicit standards to define "sustainable" biofuels, and there are
no means to enforce those standards in any case.¹⁹

Impact of Climate Change and Environmental Degradation

Beyond the push for biofuels, the food crisis is also being driven by
extreme weather events and environmental degradation.

The phrase "global warming" implies only the fact that the world's
average temperature increase by a degree or more over the next few decades.
The much greater problem for farmers is destabilization of weather
patterns. We face not just a warmer climate, but climate chaos:
droughts, floods, and stronger storms in general (hurricanes, cyclones,
tornadoes, hail storms) - in short, unpredictable weather of all kinds.
Farmers depend on relatively consistent seasonal patterns of rain and sun,
cold and heat; a climate shift can spell the end of farmers' ability to
grow a crop in a given region, and even a single freak storm can destroy an
entire year's national production for some crops. Given the fact that
modern agriculture has become highly centralized due to cheap transport and
economies of scale, the damage from that freak storm is today potentially
continental or even global in scale. We have embarked on a century in
which, increasingly, freakish weather is normal.

According to the UN's World Food Program (WFP), 57 countries, including
29 in Africa, 19 in Asia and nine in Latin America, have been hit by
catastrophic floods. Harvests have been affected by drought and heatwaves
in south Asia, Europe, China, Sudan, Mozambique and
Uruguay.²⁰

Last week the Australian government said drought had slashed predictions
of winter harvests by nearly 40 percent, or four million tons. "It is
likely to be even smaller than the disastrous drought-ravaged 2006-07
harvest and the worst in more than a decade," said the Bureau of
Agriculture and Resource.²¹

In addition to climate chaos, we must contend with the depletion or
degradation of several resources essential to agriculture.

Phosphorus is set to become much more scarce and expensive, according to
a study by Patrick Déry, a Canadian agriculture and environment analyst and
consultant. Using data from the US Geological Survey, Déry performed a
peaking analysis on phosphate rock, similar to the techniques used by
petroleum geologists to forecast declines in production from oilfields. He
found that "we have already passed the phosphate peak for United States
(1988) and for the World (1989)." We will not completely run out of rock
phosphate any time soon, but we will be relying on lower-grade ores as time
goes on, with prices inexorably rising.²²

At the same time, soil erosion undermines food production and water
availability, as well as producing 30 percent of climate-changing
greenhouse gases. Each year, roughly 100,000 square kilometres of land
loses its vegetation and becomes degraded or turns into desert, altering
the temperature and energy balance of the planet.²³

Finally, yet another worrisome environmental trend is the increasing
scarcity of fresh water. According to United Nations estimates, one third
of the world's population lives in areas with water shortages and 1.1
billion people lack access to safe drinking water. That situation is
expected to worsen dramatically over the next few decades. Climate change
has provoked more frequent and intense droughts in sub-tropical areas of
Asia and Africa, exacerbating shortages in some of the world's poorest
countries.

While human population tripled in the 20th century, the use of renewable
water resources has grown six-fold. According to Bridget Scanlon and
colleagues, writing in Water Resources Research this past March 27, in the
last 100 years irrigated agriculture expanded globally by 480 percent, and
it is projected to increase another 20 percent by 2030 in developing
countries. Irrigation is expanding fastest in countries such as China and
India. Global irrigated agriculture now accounts for almost 90 percent of
global freshwater consumption, despite representing only 18 percent of
global cropland. In addition to drawing down aquifers and surface water
sources, it also degrades water quality, as salts in soils are mobilized,
and as fertilizers and pesticides leach into aquifers and
streams.²⁴

These problems all interact and compound one another. For example, soil
degradation produces growing shortages of water, since soil and vegetation
act as a sponge that holds and gradually releases water. Soil degradation
also worsens climate change as increased evaporation triggers more extreme
weather.

This month the UN Environment Program concluded that the planet's water,
land, air, plants, animals and fish stocks are all in "inexorable decline."
Much of this decline is due to agriculture, which constitutes the greatest
single source of human impact on the biosphere.²⁵

In the face of all these daunting challenges, the world must produce
more food every year to keep up with population growth. Zafar Adeel,
director of the International Network on Water, Environment and Health
(INWEH), has calculated that more food will have to be produced during the
next 50 years than during the last 10,000 years combined.²⁶

What Is the Solution?

International food agency officials spin out various scenarios to
describe how our currently precarious global food system might successfully
adapt and expand. Perhaps markets will automatically readjust to shortages,
higher prices making it more profitable once again to grow crops for people
rather than cars. New designer-gene crop varieties could help crops adapt
to capricious climactic conditions, to require less water, or to grow in
more marginal soils. And if people were to simply eat less meat, more land
could be freed up to grow food for humans rather than farm animals. A
slowdown or reversal in population growth would naturally ease pressures on
the food system, while the cultivation of currently unproductive land could
help increase supplies.

However, given the scale of the crisis facing us, merely to assume that
these things will happen, or that they will be sufficient to overcome the
dilemmas we have been discussing, seems overly optimistic, perhaps even to
the point of irresponsibility.

One hopeful sign is that governments and international agencies are
beginning to take the situation seriously. This month the World Bank issued
a major report, "Agriculture for Development," whose main author, economist
Alain de Janvry, appears to reverse his institution's traditional stance.
For a half-century, development agencies such as the World Bank have
minimized the importance of agriculture, urging nations to industrialize
and urbanize as rapidly as possible. Indeed, the Bank has not featured
agriculture in an annual report since 1982. De Janvry says that, since half
the world's population and three-quarters of the world's poor live in rural
areas where food production is the mainstay of the economy, farming must be
central to efforts to reduce hunger and poverty.²⁷

Many agencies, including the INWEH, are now calling for an end to the
estimated 30 billion dollars in food subsidies in the North that contribute
directly to land degradation in Africa and elsewhere, and that force poor
farmers to intensify their production in order to compete.²⁸

In addition, there are calls for sweeping changes in how land use
decisions are made at all levels of government. Because soil, water,
energy, climate, biodiversity, and food production are interconnected,
integrated policy-making is essential. Yet policies currently are set by
various different governmental departments and agencies that often have
little understanding of one another's sectors.

Delegates at a soils forum in Iceland this month took up a proposal for
a formal agreement on protecting the world's soils. And the World Water
Council is promoting a range of programs to ensure the availability of
clean water especially to people in poorer countries.²⁹

All these efforts are laudable; however, they largely fail to address
the common sources of the dilemmas we face - human population growth, and
society's and agriculture's reliance on fossil fuels.

The solution most often promoted by the biggest companies within the
agriculture industry - the bioengineering of crops and farm animals - does
little or nothing to address these deeper causes. One can fantasize about
modifying maize or rice to fix nitrogen in the way that legumes do, but so
far efforts in that direction have failed. Meanwhile, and the
bio-engineering industry itself consumes fossil fuels, and assumes the
continued availability of oil for tractors, transportation, chemicals
production, and so on.³⁰

To get to the heart of the crisis, we need a more fundamental reform of
agriculture than anything we have seen in many decades. In essence, we need
an agriculture that does not require fossil fuels.

The idea is not new. The aim of substantially or entirely removing
fossil fuels from agriculture is implicit in organic farming in all its
various forms and permutations - including ecological agriculture,
Biodynamics, Permaculture, Biointensive farming, and Natural Farming. All
also have in common a prescription for the reduction or elimination of
tillage, and the reduction or elimination of reliance on mechanized farm
equipment. Nearly all of these systems rely on increased amounts of human
labor, and on greater application of place-specific knowledge of soils,
microorganisms, weather, water, and interactions between plants, animals,
and humans.

Critics of organic or biological agriculture have always contended that
chemical-free and less-mechanized forms of food production are incapable of
feeding the burgeoning human population. This view is increasingly being
challenged.

A recent survey of studies, by Christos Vasilikiotis, Ph.D., U.C.
Berkeley, titled "Can Organic Farming Feed the World?", concluded: "From
the studies mentioned above and from an increasing body of case studies, it
is becoming evident that organic farming does not result in either
catastrophic crop losses due to pests nor in dramatically reduced yields. .
. ."³¹

The most recent publication on the subject, by Perfecto et al., in
Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems, found that "Organic farming
can yield up to three times as much food on individual farms in developing
countries, as methods on the same land. . . ."³²

Moreover, is clear that ecological agriculture could help directly to
address the dilemmas we have been discussing.

Regarding water, organic production can help by building soil structure,
thus reducing the need for irrigation. And with no petrochemical runoff,
water quality is not degraded.³³

Soil erosion and land degradation can be halted and even reversed: by
careful composting, organic farmers have demonstrated the ability to build
humus at many times the natural rate.³⁴

Climate change can be addressed, by keeping carbon molecules in the soil
and in forests and grasslands. Indeed, as much as 20 percent of anticipated
net fossil fuel emissions between now and 2050 could be stored in this way,
according to Maryam Niamir-Fuller of the U.N. Development
Program.³⁵

Natural gas depletion will mean higher prices and shortages for
ammonia-based nitrogen fertilizers. But ecologically sound
organic-biological agricultural practices use plant and manure-based
fertilizers rather than fossil fuels. And when farmers concentrate on
building healthy topsoil rich in beneficial microbes, plants have reduced
needs for nitrogen.³⁶

The impending global shortage of phosphate will be more difficult to
address, as there is no substitute for this substance. The only solution
here will be to recycle nutrients by returning all animal and humans
manures to cultivated soil, as Asian farmers did for many centuries, and as
many ecological farmers have long advocated.³⁷

What Will Be Needed

How might we actually accomplish this comprehensive transformation or
world agriculture? Some clues are offered by the example of a society that
has already experienced and dealt with a fossil-fuel famine.

In the late 1980s, farmers in Cuba were highly reliant on cheap fuels
and petrochemicals imported from the Soviet Union, using more agrochemicals
per acre than their US counterparts. In 1990, as the Soviet empire
collapsed, Cuba lost those imports and faced an agricultural crisis. The
average Cuban lost 20 pounds of body weight and malnutrition was nearly
universal. The Cuban GDP fell dramatically and inhabitants of the island
nation experienced a substantial decline in their material standard of
living.³⁸

Several agronomists at Cuban universities had for many years been
advocating a transition to organic methods. Cuban authorities responded to
the crisis by giving these ecological agronomists carte blanche to redesign
the nation's food system. Officials broke up large state-owned farms,
offered land to farming families, and encouraged the formation of small
agricultural co-ops. Cuban farmers began employing oxen as a replacement
for the tractors they could no longer afford to fuel. Cuban scientists
began investigating biological methods of pest control and soil fertility
enhancement. The government sponsored widespread education in organic food
production, and the Cuban people adopted a mostly vegetarian diet out of
necessity. Salaries for agricultural workers were raised, in many cases to
above the levels of urban office workers. Urban gardens were encouraged in
parking lots and on public lands, and thousands of rooftop gardens
appeared. Small food animals such as chickens and rabbits began to be
raised on rooftops as well.

As a result of these efforts, Cuba was able to avoid what might
otherwise have been a severe famine.

If the rest of the world does not plan for a reduction in fossil fuel
use in agriculture, its post-peak-oil agricultural transition may be far
less successful than was Cuba's. Already in poor countries, farmers who are
attempting to apply industrial methods but cannot afford tractor fuel and
petrochemical inputs are watching their crops fail. Soon farmers in
wealthier nations will be having a similar experience.

Where food is still being produced, there will be the challenge of
getting it to the stores. Britain had a taste of this problem in 2000;
David Strahan relates in his brilliant book The Last Oil Shock how
close Britain came to political chaos then as truckers went on strike
because of high fuel costs. He writes: "Supermarket shelves were being
stripped of staple foods in scenes of panic buying. Sainsbury, Asda, and
Safeway reported that some branches were having to ration bread and
milk."³⁹ This was, of course, merely a brief interruption in the
normal functioning of the British energy-food system. In the future we may
be facing instead what my colleague James Howard Kunstler calls "the long
emergency."⁴⁰

How will Britain and the rest of the world cope? What will be needed to
ensure a successful transition away from an oil-based food system, as
opposed to a haphazard and perhaps catastrophic one?

Because ecological organic farming methods are often dramatically more
labor- and knowledge-intensive than industrial agriculture, their adoption
will require an economic transformation of societies. The transition to a
non-fossil-fuel food system will take time. Nearly every aspect of the
process by which we feed ourselves must be redesigned. And, given the
likelihood that global oil peak will occur soon, this transition must occur
at a forced pace, backed by the full resources of national governments.

Without cheap transportation fuels we will have to reduce the amount of
food transportation that occurs, and make necessary transportation more
efficient. This implies increased local food self-sufficiency. It also
implies problems for large cities that have been built in arid regions
capable of supporting only small populations from their regional resource
base. In some cases, relocation of people on a large scale may be
necessary.

We will need to grow more food in and around cities. Recently, Oakland
California adopted a food policy that mandates by 2015 the growing within a
fifty-mile radius of city center of 40 percent of the vegetables consumed
in the city.⁴¹

Localization of food systems means moving producers and consumers of
food closer together, but it also means relying on the local manufacture
and regeneration of all of the elements of the production process - from
seeds to tools and machinery. This again would appear to rule out
agricultural bioengineering, which favors the centralized production of
patented seed varieties, and discourages the free saving of seeds from year
to year by farmers.

Clearly, we must also minimize indirect chemical inputs to agriculture -
such as those introduced in packaging and processing.

We will need to re-introduce draft animals in agricultural production.
Oxen may be preferable to horses in many instances, because the former can
eat straw and stubble, while the latter would compete with humans for
grains. We can only bring back working animals to the extent that we can
free up land with which to produce food for them. One way to do that would
be to reduce the number of farm animals grown for meat.

Governments must also provide incentives for people to return to an
agricultural life. It would be a mistake to think of this simply in terms
of the need for a larger agricultural work force. Successful traditional
agriculture requires social networks and intergenerational sharing of
skills and knowledge. We need not just more agricultural workers, but a
rural culture that makes farming a rewarding way of life capable of
attracting young people.

Farming requires knowledge and experience, and so we will need education
for a new generation of farmers; but only some of this education can be
generic - much of it must of necessity be locally appropriate.

It will be necessary as well to break up the corporate mega-farms that
produce so much of today's cheap food. Industrial agriculture implies an
economy of scale that will be utterly inappropriate and unworkable for
post-industrial food systems. Thus land reform will be required in order to
enable smallholders and farming co-ops to work their own plots.

In order for all of this to happen, governments must end subsidies to
industrial agriculture and begin subsidizing post-industrial agricultural
efforts. There are many ways this could be done. The present regime of
subsidies is so harmful that merely stopping it in its tracks might be
advantageous; but, given the fact that rapid adaptation is essential,
offering subsidies for education, no-interest loans for land purchase, and
technical support during the transition from chemical to organic production
would be essential.

Finally, given carrying-capacity limits, food policy must include
population policy. We must encourage smaller families by means of economic
incentives and improve the economic and educational status of women in
poorer countries.

All of this constitutes a gargantuan task, but the alternatives - doing
nothing or attempting to solve our food-production problems simply by
applying mere techno-fixes - will almost certainly lead to dire
consequences. All of the worrisome trends mentioned earlier would intensify
to the point that the human carrying capacity of Earth would be degraded
significantly, and perhaps to a large degree permanently.⁴²

So far we have addressed the responsibility of government in
facilitating the needed transformation in agriculture. Consumers can help
enormously by becoming more conscious of their food choices, seeking out
locally produced organic foods and reducing meat consumption.

The organic movement, while it may view the crisis in industrial
agriculture as an opportunity, also bears an enormous responsibility. In
the example of Cuba just cited, the active lobbying of organic agronomists
proved crucial. Without that guiding effort on the part of previously
marginalized experts, the authorities would have had no way to respond. Now
crisis is at hand for the world as a whole. The organic movement has most
of the answers that will be needed; however, its message still isn't
getting through. Three things will be necessary to change that.

1. The various strands of the organic movement must come together
   so that they can speak to national and international policy makers with a
   unified voice.
2. The leaders of this newly unified organic movement must produce a
   coherent plan for a global transition to a post-fossil-fuel food system.
   Organic farmers and their organizations have been promoting some of the
   needed policies for decades in a piecemeal fashion. Now, however, there is
   an acute need for a clearly formulated, comprehensive, alternative national
   and global food policy, and there is little time to communicate and
   implement it. It is up to the organic movement to proactively seek out
   policy makers and promote this coherent alternative, just as it is up to
   representatives of government at all levels to listen.
3. I have just called for unity in the organic movement, and to achieve
   this it will be necessary to address a recent split within the movement.
   What might be called traditional organic remains focused on small-scale,
   labor-intensive, local production for local consumption. In contrast to
   this, the more recently emerging corporate organic model merely removes
   petrochemicals from production, while maintaining nearly all the other
   characteristics of the modern industrial food system. This trend may be
   entirely understandable in terms of the economic pressures and incentives
   within the food industry as a whole. However, corporate organic has much
   less to offer in terms of solutions to the emerging crisis. Thus as the
   various strands of the organic movement come together, they should do so in
   light of the larger societal necessity. The discussion must move beyond
   merely gaining market share; it must focus on averting famine under crisis
   conditions.

To conclude, let me simply restate what is I hope clear by now: Given
the fact that fossil fuels are limited in quantity and that we are already
in view of the global oil production peak, we must turn to a food
system that is less fuel-reliant, even if the process is problematic in
many ways. Of course, the process will take time; it is a journey that will
take place over decades. Nevertheless, it must begin soon, and it must
begin with a comprehensive plan. The transition to a fossil-fuel-free food
system does not constitute a distant utopian proposal. It is an
unavoidable, immediate, and immense challenge that will call for
unprecedented levels of creativity at all levels of society. A hundred
years from now, everyone will be eating what we today would define as
organic food, whether or not we act. But what we do now will determine how
many will be eating, what state of health will be enjoyed by those future
generations, and whether they will live in a ruined cinder of a world, or
one that is in the process of being renewed and replenished.

Notes

1. See Fernand Braudel, The Structures of Everyday Life (New
York: Harper & Row, 1982)
2. See Vaclav Smil, Enriching the Earth: Fritz Haber, Carl Bosch, and
the Transformation of World Food Production (Boston: WIT Press,
2004)
3. David Pimentel, "Constraints on the Expansion of Global Food Supply,"
Kindell, Henry H. and Pimentel, David. Ambio Vol. 23 No. 3, May 1994. The
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. http://www.dieoff.com/page36htm
4. See also Roger D. Blanchard, The Future of Global Oil Production:
Facts, Figures, Trend and Projections (Jefferson, North Carolina:
McFarland, 2005)
5. Longwell, "The future of the oil and gas industry: past approaches, new
challenges," World Energy Vol. 5 #3, 2002 http://www.worldenergysource.com/articles/pdf/longwell_WE_v5n3.pdf
6. Energy Watch Group, "Crude Oil - The Supply Outlook," http://www.energywatchgroup.de/fileadmin/global/pdf/EWG_Oilreport_10-2007.pdf
7. "Oil Supplies Face More Pressure," BBC online, July 9 2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6283992.stm
8. Energy Watch Group, "Coal: Resources and Future Production" (April,
2007). http://www.energywatchgroup.org/files/Coalreport.pdf
9. John Vidal, "Global Food Crisis Looms as Climate Change and Fuel
Shortages Bite," The Guardian, Nov. 3, 2007 http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/nov/03/food.climatechange
10. Jacques Diouf quoted in John Vidal, op. cit.
11. http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/nov/03/food.climatechange
12. http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/ah876e/ah876e00.htm
13. Peter Apps, "Cost of Food Aid Soars As Global Need Rises, Reuters,
October 16 http://africa.reuters.com/top/news/usnBAN648660.html
14. See Jack Santa Barbara, The False Promise of Biofuels (San
Francisco: International Forum on Globalization, 2007)
15. Vidal, op. cit.
16. Lester Brown quoted in Vidal, op. cit.
17. "IMF Concerned by Impact of Biofuels of Food Prices," Industry
Week online, October 18, 2007, http://www.industryweek.com/ReadArticle.aspx?ArticleID=15197
18. Ziegler, quoted by George Monbiot http://www.monbiot.com/archives/2007/11/06/an-agricultural-crime-against-humanity/
19. Monbiot, op. cit.
20. Vidal, op. cit.
21. Vidal, op. cit.
22. Patrick Déry and Bart Anderson, "Peak Phosphorus," http://energybulletin.net/33164.html
23. http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=39083
24. "Agriculture Consuming World's Water," Geotimes online, June 2007 http://www.geotimes.org/june07/article.html?id=nn_agriculture.html
25. "Unsustainable Development 'Puts Humanity at Risk'," New
Scientist online, October 17 2007, http://environment.newscientist.com/article/dn12834
26. "Between Hungry People and Climate Change, Soils Need Help,"
Environmental New Service, August 31, 2007, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/aug2007/2007-08-31-03.asp

27. Celia W. Dugger, "World Bank Puts Agriculture at Center of Anti-Poverty
Effort," New York Times, October 20, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com...
28. Stephen Leahy, "Dirt Isn't So Cheap After All," http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=39083
29. Ibid.; http://www.worldwatercouncil.org
30. See, for example, William M. Muir, "Potential environmental risks and
hazards of biotechnology," http://www.biotech-info.net/potential_risks.html
31. http://www.cnr.berkeley.edu/~christos/articles/cv_organic_farming.html
32. (vol 22, p 86) University of Michigan, July 10, 2007
33. "Organic Agriculture," FAO report, 1999, http://www.fao.org/unfao/bodies/COAG/COAG15/X0075E.htm

34. Ibid.
35. "Between Hungry People and Climate Change, Soils Need Help,"
Environmental New Service, August 31, 2007, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/aug2007/2007-08-31-03.asp

36. FAO, op. cit.
37. F.H. King, Farmers of Forty Centuries: Organic Farming in China,
Korea and Japan, (New York: Dover Publications, 1911, ed. 2004)
38. The story of how Cuba responded to its oil famine is described in the
film, "The Power of Community," http://www.powerofcommunity.org
39. David Strahan, The Last Oil Shock (London: John Murray, 2007),
p. 15
40. James Howard Kunstler, The Long Emergency (Nerw York: Atlantic Monthly
Press, 2005)
41. Matthew Green, "Oakland Looks toward Greener Pastures," Edible East
Bay, Spring 2007, http://www.edibleeastbay.com/pages/articles/spring2007/pdfs/oakland.pdf
42. Peter Goodchild, "Agriculture In A Post-Oil Economy," 22 September,
2007
http://www.countercurrents.org/goodchild220907.htm